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The purpose of this study was to investigate the feasibility of using personal mobile 
devices for Naval e-Learning (NeL). Another objective was to find out which mobile 
device and which method of authentication offers the most practical and secure form of 
essentially bring your own device (BYOD). The use of personal mobile devices to access 
NeL is a form of BYOD. Finally, Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) was examined in 
this study as another secured means to access NeL from BYOD.  
This study tested the various mobile devices that were Department of Defense 
(DOD) approved for network use. The study also tested the Common Access Card (CAC) 
readers that are approved by DOD for CAC authentication against the approved mobile 
devices. Then the mobile devices and CAC readers’ functionality were tested in a VDI 
environment to examine the various layers of security that could be implemented when 
using BYOD on DOD networks to maintain the necessary level of information 
protection.  
The results of this study show the iOS devices were capable of accessing NeL 
training site via the approved CAC readers. However, the iOS devices could only access 
and enroll, they were unable to launch training due to Flash not being supported by the 
native browser, the language used to develop NeL training. The results also revealed 
attempts to use the iOS device and CAC in a VDI to be unsuccessful as a work around to 
the Flash issue with the iOS browser. 
The principal conclusion is that through the use of multi-layer security BYOD 
could be used to access NeL—making it truly available “whenever and wherever.” There 
is also a need to look into ways authentication can be done without the use of hardware 
readers. Finally, there is also the need to develop training to support multiple browsers. 
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As part of the Navy’s goal to make Navy training accessible “whenever and 
wherever,” the Navy Education and Training Command (NETC) and Sea Warrior 
Program Office has made the content of Navy e-Learning (NeL) directly accessible from 
the Internet (Barker, 2014). There is no longer the need to access Navy Knowledge 
Online (NKO) in order to gain access to the learning management system NeL.  
NeL is an educational portal resource that hosts learning and training for Sailors, 
government civilians, and contractors, and it is used by active duty, reserve, and retired 
enlisted and officers for both personal and professional use. Since its inception in 2001, 
this has been the Navy’s way of keeping the lines of communication and sharing open 
between active, reserve and retired personnel. NeL offers more than 8,700 courses 
annually. It is boasted that there are more than four million courses completed via NeL 
yearly (Baker, 2014). 
NeL utilizes the latest version of Internet Explorer (IE) and requires a Common 
Access Card (CAC) to login. A CAC is required as part of the Information Assurance 
(IA) policy instituted by the Department of Defense (DOD) 8500.01E. This limits 
potential users from being able to access NeL from various mobile devices “whenever 
and wherever.” NeL is also expected to maintain a high level of security due to the type 
of information being accessed via the Internet.  
Until the Navy is comfortable with the level of security that can be achieved via 
personal secure mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) as well as updating 
browser compatibility the goal of “whenever and wherever” will not be realized. In large 
part, this is because of the need to maintain a heightened level of security for the type of 
information that could be potentially transmitted via mobile devices. This is due to the 
nature of personal mobile devices continuously left on and always in one’s possession, 
which makes them susceptible to being lost or stolen and the information stored within 
fall into the wrong hands. This same argument can be made for Blackberries, which are 
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government owned and issued; however, the protective measures include two key factors 
1) the government owns the information stored within 2) should the device be 
compromised the government can remotely shut down and swipe the device once 
notified.  
There is current technology and safeguards available, similar to those used for 
government owned devices that could be implemented to secure personal mobile devices. 
This thesis will address some of the technologies and safeguards currently available that 
could potentially bring the Navy closer to the realization of the goal “whenever and 
wherever” NeL training.  
B. SCOPE 
For the purpose of this thesis, training pertains strictly to electronic learning. The 
study will identify the policies, guidelines, strategies, and plans. It will also evaluate and 
rank those mobile devices and readers necessary to support a secure connection from 
personal secure mobile devices to an unclassified Naval e-Learning web portal for the 
purpose of providing NeL whenever and wherever. The study will define the term bring 
your own device (BYOD) and then identify concerns/issues with the use of BYOD. 
Chapter II discusses the current DOD polices, plans, governance established for mobile 
devices also known as mobile computing, and Defense Information Systems Agency’s 
(DISA) role in DOD use of mobile devices. Chapter III identifies the approved mobile 
devices configuration requirements, the various types of credentialing methods available 
for secure authentication, and the system architecture for mobile computing. Chapter IV 
presents a proof of concept study to evaluate the capabilities of approved mobile devices 
and readers necessary to make a secure connection to the NeL site for the purpose of 
enrolling and launching a training session. Chapter V provides the conclusion and offers 
future recommended research.  
C. BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE 
The definition of BYOD is the practice where employees bring their own personal 
mobile computing devices into the workspace for use on the company’s network. The 
mobile devices include, but are not limited to smartphones, tablets, and personal data 
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assistants. The demand for BYOD within the workforces is becoming more and more 
popular because of the advancements in technology. These devices are smaller, light 
weight, easily accessible and in some instances offer the same/similar computing power 
as a traditional laptop or desktop. 
D. CONCERNS WITH BYOD 
The number one concern with BYOD is security. Due to existing policies, 
operational construct and security vulnerabilities currently there is not an executable 
DOD BYOD plan (Department of Defense, 2013). The Defense Information Systems 
Agency, along with other DOD components, is looking at trying to close the gap with the 
use of Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) technology. This is an area that is being 
closely monitored by the CIO for implementation in conjunction with the Digital 
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II. DOD POLICIES, GUIDELINES AND PLANS FOR MOBILE 
DEVICE USE 
The DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) stated in the May 2012 roll out of the 
DOD Mobile Device Strategy that it is not just about embracing the latest technology but 
more about keeping the Department’s workforce relevant when it comes to critical roles 
cybersecurity and information accessibility plays in today’s mission accomplishment. 
The DOD lags behind in keeping pace with technology and the ability to access 
information whenever and wherever necessary. In an effort to try and remedy this issue, 
the DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan was released February 2013.  
A. DOD COMMERCIAL MOBILE DEVICE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The DOD (2013) Commercial Mobile Device (CMD) plan is a phased approach to 
implementing mobile secure classified and protected unclassified information while 
utilizing commercial off-the-shelf technology. The leading agency for the implementation 
of this plan is the Defense Information System Agency (DISA). 
The Defense Information Systems Agency has been tasked with developing an 
enterprise solution, which promotes mobile Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) 
conditions necessary to support utilizing commercial carrier infrastructure while 
providing an entry point for classified services. The DOD (2012b) Instruction 5200.01 
defines CUI as unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination 
controls, pursuant to and consistent with applicable laws, regulations and government-
wide policies. This along with unclassified information, will be addressed in this study 
although, the CMD plan covers both secure classified and protected unclassified mobility 
requirements. In particular this study will focus on the use of personally owned and 




The vision of the CMD plan is to develop a framework, which will capitalize on 
the goals of the Mobile Device Strategy by exploiting mobile device technologies in order 
to achieve information technology mobility goals (DOD, 2012a). These goals, as 
identified in the Mobile Device Strategy, are to develop a wireless infrastructure, utilize 
current mobile devices, and develop DOD approved mobile applications. This study will 
touch on each of the identified goals with a focus on the mobile device itself. This plan is 
designed to support a device-agnostic approach for the CMD environment. This approach 
is in an effort to support a variety of operational use case scenarios.  
B. DOD INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY 
In order to achieve the vision of the CMD plan it is necessary that particular 
attention be paid to information security. Due to this being somewhat unchartered 
territory for the DOD, the development of wireless mobility architecture will live and die 
by the security of the information that transverse its network.  
In general the purpose of DOD manual 5200.01, volume 1 (2012c) states that it is 
to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for the designation, 
marking and protection, and dissemination of CUI and classified information including 
information categorized as collateral sensitive compartmented information, and special 
access program. The focus will be on the protection of unclassified information and CUI.  
Although a larger majority of DOD’s business is conducted on the Non-secure 
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) in the unclassified domain there still exist 
the requirement for all DOD unclassified information to be reviewed and approved for 
release through standard DOD component processes before it is provided to the public in 
accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5230.09 Clearance of DOD 
Information for Public Release (DOD, 2012c). This is primarily for the purpose of 
maintaining operation security. This is accomplished by the use of standards developed 
by NIST. The standard used for security categorization of information and information 
systems is the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 199.  
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The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347) 
defines three security objectives for information and information systems as the 
following:  
 Confidentiality: “Preserving authority restriction on information access 
and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information…” (44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542). A loss of 
confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information. 
 Integrity: “Guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity…” (44 U.S.C, Sec. 3542). A loss of integrity is the 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information. 
 Availability: “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information…” (44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542). A loss of availability is the 
disruption of access to or use of information or an information system. 
The FIPS 199 defines the impact that a breach of either of the above security 
objectives would have on the organization or individuals. Table 1 summarizes the 














Table 1.   Potential Impact Definitions for Security Objectives  
(from NIST, 2004)  
 POTENTIAL IMPACT 
















be expected to have 










be expected to have 










be expected to have 
a severe or 
catastrophic 






















be expected to have 











be expected to have 











be expected to have 
a severe or 
catastrophic 













The disruption of 
access to or use of 
information or an 
information system 
could be expected to 
have a limited 






The disruption of 
access to or use of 
information or an 
information system 
could be expected to 
have a serious 






The disruption of 
access to or use of 
information or an 
information system 
could be expected to 
have a severe or 
catastrophic 








C. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY’S ROLE 
The Defense Information Systems Agency is essentially the DOD’s gatekeeper 
for networked information. The mission and vision of DISA per its website is to be a:  
Combat Support Agency, that provides and assures command and control, 
information sharing capabilities, and a globally accessible enterprise 
information infrastructure in direct support to joint Warfighters, National 
level leaders, and other mission and coalition partners across the full 
spectrum of operations. (DISA, n.d.-a) 
Its vision is simply, “Information superiority in defense of the Nation” (DISA, 
n.d.-a).  
Defense Information Systems Agency offers a multitude of services to its mission 
partners; the following are few of the services that are provided. 
 Command and Control (C2) 
 Computing  
 Contracting  
 Enterprise Engineering  
 Enterprise Services  
 Applications 
 Infrastructure 
 Identity and Access Management  
 Information Assurance 
 Network Services (Defense Information Systems Network [DISN]) 
 Data 
 Voice  
 Video 




 Testing (DOD, 2012a) 
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This list serves as the basis behind the unified capabilities (UC) concept. It will 
provide as the widespread continuous UC at the high level of operational concept for any 
user whenever and wherever on any device. Figure 1 depicts the overarching UC 
operational concept model (OV-1).  
 
Figure 1.  UC High-Level Operational Framework (from DOD, 2013) 
This can only be achieved through a dynamic and robust method of information 
sharing. The Defense Information System Agency is looking to achieve this type of 
information sharing for DOD and other federal agencies for enterprise-level secure and 
protected off the shelf mobility solution through development of a seven-focus area 
approach. This will be accomplished through the DOD Mobility Program of which DISA 
is the lead agent.  
Mobility serves as the key enabler to allowing mission partners to connect to the 
Joint Information Environment (JIE) “whenever and wherever” via authorized mobile 
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devices. DOD and DISA are looking to establish policies and procedures to advance 
information sharing, collaboration, and efficiencies through the use of secure mobile 
technologies with security and performance as their primary goals.  
The DOD (2012a) Mobile Device Strategy has laid out four mobility goals for 
DISA to achieve:  
 Goal 1: Advance and Evolve the DoD Information Enterprise 
Infrastructure to support Mobile Devices;  
 Goal 2: Institute Mobile Device Policies and Standards;  
 Goal 3: Promote the Development and Use of DoD Mobile and Web-
Enabled Applications;  
 Goal 4: Develop and Enterprise Mobility Service for Classified and 
Unclassified Capabilities (Department of Defense, 2012a).  
Mobility is no longer seen as a luxury—it has become a requirement and as the 
Program Management Office for mobility has developed a phased approach to identify, 
adopt, and securely implement a mobile solution.  
Phase 1: Nov. 2012–Apr. 2013 (The Unclassified Mobility Pilot) 
 Establish a multi-vendor mobile capability within DOD for assessment 
 Deploy voice and data services over a commercial wireless network 
 Award a contract for DOD enterprise MDM and MAS 
Phase 2: Apr.–Sept. 2013 (Pilot Expansion and Transition) 
 Establish a network infrastructure to support the user community 
 Deploy mobile devices to Military Service and Combatant Command 
users 
Phase 3: Oct. 2013 and beyond (Operational Capability) 
 Mobility becomes an operational capability offered to the DOD enterprise 
as a subscription service 
 Enterprise contracts to support data plans and purchase of approved 
devices will be established. (DISA, n.d.-a) 
The DISA’s mobility foundation is built on the implementation and integration of 
the Mobile Device Manager (MDM), Mobile Application Store (MAS), and Mobile 
Virtual Private Network (MVPN) to provide secure and reliable services to the warfighter 
and other federal employees whenever wherever. This foundation aids in closing the 
technology gap that exists in DOD by offering a network infrastructure that boosts 
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delivery of 3G and 4G LTE services in order to extend UC. This approach provides DOD 
with an enterprise solution at a significant savings, while eliminating duplication and 
promoting economies of scales.  
D. DISA’S APPROACH TO APPROVING MOBILE DEVICES 
In an effort to keep pace with current technologies while maintaining a level of 
security necessary to protect the nation’s networks, DISA has streamlined to the device 
approval process. This streamlined approach consists of five steps: (1) DISA 
identification of IA requirements; (2) industry development of a device with a Security 
Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) in accordance with the IA guidance; (3) 
simultaneous delivery of device and STIG; (4) DISA review of device and STIG for 
compliance; and (5) device approval for DOD use in conjunction with release to 
commercial market (“Secure Unclassified,” n.d.).  
A STIG is a standardized secure methodology implemented by DISA for 
installing and maintaining hardware and software for computers. It is implemented on all 
DOD computing devices for security purposes locking down the device to protect against 
vulnerabilities.  
E. APPROVED MOBILE DEVICES 
To date DISA has approved the following mobile devices and operating systems, 
listed in Table 2. 
Table 2.   DOD Approved Mobile Devices (from DISA, n,d.-b) 
OPERATING SYSTEMS SMARTPHONES TABLETS 
Apple iOS (7.1.x) iPhone 4, 4S, 5, and 5S iPad Mini, 2, 3, and 4 
iPad Mini-R 
iPad Air  






III. MOBILE DEVICE AND CREDENTIALING REQUIREMENTS 
A. MOBILE DEVICES 
The following mobile devices have been tested and approved by DISA the DOD 
Mobility Program Management Office. 
1. Samsung Android 
On May 3, 2013, DISA approved the first release of Android/Samsung KNOX 1.x 
capability. The 2.x version was approved for release on May 9, 2014. The STIG supports 
KNOX 1.x version, which supports MDM for secure access to DOD networks. It also 
supports Defense Enterprise Email and For Official Use Only (FOUO) environment 
calendar and contact synch capability. The operating system (OS) offers access to the 19 
tested and approved applications currently offered at the Mobile Application Store 
(MAS). Features such as Wi-Fi, GPS, Bluetooth, native browser, contacts, and device 
encryption are also offered on the mobile device. 
These features were made possible by Samsung development and approval of the 
STIG that supports its KNOX capability. The KNOX is a security feature that allows 
both a personal and work environment to exist together on a single mobile device. This 
security feature is achieved by a method identified as “container.” It is a part of Samsung 
Approved For Enterprise (SAFE) approach to providing a more secure smartphone and 
tablet (Samsung & DISA, 2014a).  
a. Samsung Android KNOX IA Features 
Samsung offers the following IA features, which aid in developing the secure 
environment through multi-layer security necessary to access a DOD network.  
 Mobile Application quarantine 
 Smart Card support 
 Host-based firewall 
 Ability to revoke mobile application permissions 
 Over-the-Air (OTA) audit log retrieval 
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 Support for PKI authentication and certificate verification in native 
browser (Samsung & DISA, 2014a) 
The Samsung Android Platform that supports these IA features is an extension of 
the Android 4.1.1 SELinux-enabled kernel, which supports the SAFE technology that 
allows the use of MDM control. Samsung KNOX 1.0 is support by Samsung Galaxy S3, 
S4 and Android 4.2.2 and 4.3 in the Galaxy Note 2 and 3 (Samsung & DISA, 2014).  
b. Samsung Android KNOX Security Features  
The Samsung Android features a dual workspace environment made available 
through the KNOX technology, which is based on compartmentalizing the various 
workspaces into their own secure isolated containers. This is made possible by the 
following security features: 
 Separate home screen, launcher, applications and widgets.  
 AES 256 encryption of all container data using a FIPS 140-2 validated 
cryptographic module.  
 No interaction between applications and data inside and outside the 
container.  
 Password based access control mechanism that is independent of the 
device lock screen.  
 Data in transit protection of all container network traffic using a VPN 
employing FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules.  
 Container only configuration and management policies including 
application  management, password complexity, CAC configurations for 
browser and email, and remote wipe of only the container (Samsung & 
DISA, 2014a). 
According to DISA “As a device owned and issued by DOD the guidelines for 
use falls under the terms of the DOD Information Systems User Agreement therefore 
there is no expectation of privacy when utilizing the device regardless of the workspace 
environment” (Samsung & DISA, 2014). For more information on the details of the 
container technology and expected use when on a DOD network see Appendix A.  
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c. KNOX Container Configuration 
The KNOX container is configured to be controlled by the MDM through polices 
set in the STIG, separate and independent of those of the device. The following container 
policies, as well as the STIG policies, are available giving full access to the administrator.  
(i) Container Management Policies 
The controls for management allow the administrator to: 
 Create one container per device 
 Remove container and all content 
 Lock/unlock container as determined 
(ii) Container Application Management Policies 
The MDM administrator is able to control all the applications the user downloads 
and installs from the Samsung KNOX application store via the below policies: 
Package Whitelist the MDM has the authority to add and remove packages 
in the Whitelist and if configured only applications in the Whitelist can be 
installed in the container.  
 Install/Uninstall applications in the container 
 Enable/Disable applications in the container and users are blocked from 
disabled applications. 
 Start/Stop applications remotely inside the container. 
(iii) Container Password Policies 
Samsung password policies allow the MDM the same controls as those 
administered on the DOD network the administrator has the following authorizations to: 
 Set the maximum number of failed attempts before being disabled 
 Set expiration of container password 
 Set minimum length requirement 






 Set the number of previous passwords in history to prevent  against reuse 
 Set the minimum number of characters that are required to be changed 
when changing a password 
 Set the complexity of a password (e.g., uppercase, lowercase, numeric, 
and special characters) 
(iv) Container Email and Browser Policies 
The MDM has the following controls for configuration of the native email and 
browser applications. 
 Set the proxy 
 Enable/disable JavaScript 
 Enable/disable cookies 
 Enable/disable Smartcard authentication 
 Whitelist/blacklist accounts allowed in email according to domain name 
 Enable/ disable Smartcard (CAC) credentials on specific accounts 
(Samsung & DISA, 2014a) 
(v) Recommended Configuration 
Table 3 is a recommended configuration setting for MDM by Samsung to 











Table 3.   Samsung’s KNOX recommended container configuration (from 
Samsung & DISA, 2014a) 
Policy Setting  Description 
Application Whitelist Enterprise Whitelist of 
Applications  
Only those applications on 
the Whitelist can be 
installed from the KNOX 
App Store 
Minimum password length 6 Container password must be 
at least 6 characters 
Password quality Complexity Password must contain 
letters, numbers and special 
characters 
Maximum time to lock 15 min Container will auto-lock 
after 15min of inactivity  
Minimum character change 
length 
2  User must change at least 2 
characters when changing 
the password 
Maximum failed password 
attempts 
3 Container will be admin 
locked when the user fails 
to enter the correct 
password on 3 attempts 
Set http proxy DOD proxy address All browser traffic will be 
directed to the DOD proxy 
server 
Account Whitelist Enterprise email address 
domain 
Only enterprise email 
accounts will be allowed 
inside the container 
Browser Smartcard 
authentication  
Enable Enable Smartcard 
authentication for browser 
Email Smartcard credentials Enable/DOD email account Enable Smartcard 
credentials for specified 
email accounts 
 
For a more complete listing of the Samsung Android (with KNOX 1.x) STIG 
configuration see the table of configuration in Appendix B. Figure 2 is a pictorial 
representation of the framework for both the normal and KNOX container workspace in 
the Samsung Android.  
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Figure 2.  Framework for Samsung Android with KNOX 1.x  
(from Samsung, n.d.) 
2. Apple iOS 6 
On May 17, 2013, DISA officially announced the approval of the STIG for 
Apple’s iOS6 operating system. With this approval, and the MDM in place, DISA was 
able to run a pilot program allowing the secure use of commercial mobile devices on the 
DOD network.  
The approval included use with the iPhone 4S, iPad2, iPad Mini, and later models 
of the iOS operating system approved by DOD. This approval however excludes the iPod 
touch devices because it does not support the trusted boot process in the iOS operating 
system. 
a. iOS Security Features 
The STIG requires the use of a third-party product in order to provide the 
following required security features: 
 Mobile Device Management (MDM)  
 Mobile Application Management (MAM)  
 Mobile Device Integrity Scanning (MDIS) capability that allows the 
MDM administrator to scan the device for vulnerabilities 
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 Mobile Email Management (MEM) capability manages the DOD email 
and acts and interface between email server and device 
 Security container for offers FIPS 140-2 the security requirements for 
cryptographic module used in protecting sensitive but unclassified 
information  
 iOS 6 cryptographic module is FIPS 140-2 validated  
 The DOD browser must be installed inside the security container 
 CAC reader and middleware. (DOD, 2013) 
The STIG offers the flexibility to use varying products to meet the needs of the 
command, meaning as long as the product meets all the specified STIG requirements and 
documented configuration settings for that server then the products can be mixed or 
matched.  
b. iOS Provisioning and Setup 
The provisioning and setup will vary from device to device depending on the 
MDM used this is for DOD issued devices. The following is a general guideline for 
provisioning and setup: 
 Device activation follow on-screen prompt 
 Install MDM 
 Activate MDM and install DOD security profile 
 Download apps from MAS 
 Configure CAC  
 Setup iOS restriction 
 Turn off iMessage (not authorized) 
 Turn off Wi-Fi and Bluetooth they can be enable as needed 
 App Store and iTune Music Store disabled by MDM server (DOD, 2013) 
User must complete required training and sign a user agreement prior to receiving 
the mobile device.  
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c. Application Management 
Due to the malware risk associated with applications it is recommended that the 
following procedures be utilized for review and management of device applications prior 
to DISA’s App Store being made available to new users 
 Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) setup a review process for all 
apps using the MA SRG as the required documentation for review 
 Obtain an enterprise code signing identity from Apple.  
 This will allow apps to be signed with an Apple-provide key where 
developed by DOD or by a commercial vendor.  
 All approved apps are to be managed via the MAM server or a command 
sponsored app store. (DOD, 2013) 
d. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Use 
The iOS device does not support FIPS 140-2 cryptographic validation for Wi-Fi 
or Bluetooth and does not support authentication via CAC or personal identity 
verification (PIV); therefore, the following conditions apply when using these services: 
 DOD Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Wi-Fi Connection is only 
authorized for Internet gateway access only due to CAC authentication 
limitations.  
 Public Hotspot WLAN Wi-Fi Connections are not authorized. 
 Home WLAN Wi-Fi Connection is protected using Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) Counter Cipher Mode with Block Chaining Message 
Authentication Protocol (CCMP) and therefore authorized for connection. 
 The iOS Bluetooth profiles that should not be used are hands-free address 
book and synch profile. The STIG offers a check to verify users have not 
shared apps between devices. This is to protect against sensitive 
information being transmitted without the use of FIPS 140-2 validated 
encryption. (DOD, 2013) 
e. iOS Browser Requirements 
Safari, the iOS native browser, is disabled by MDM security policy due to CAC 
authentication not being support for DOD websites. Traffic will be routed through DOD 
Internet gateway via mobile Virtual Private Network (VPN) or the browser is installed 
inside the security container with a secure tunnel to the MDM server.  
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Mobile VPN used today to connect to DOD networks lacks the support of the 
CAC proxy and has issues with setup of secure connections to the back-office servers. 
Appendix C identifies advantages and disadvantages of the current VPN configuration. 
The Department of Defense is experimenting with session-based mobile VPN for secure 
connection to the network. Figure 3 is a notional connection illustrating this type of setup.  
 
Figure 3.  Notional DOD iOS 6 Connection (from DISA, 2013) 
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B. ACCESS CONTROL METHODS 
Access control includes the process of identification, authentication and 
authorization for access to DOD protected information. These methods include physical, 
logical, and administrative controls used to protect or prevent unauthorized access to 
protected information. Physical controls are used to prevent access to a device interior or 
exterior by means of physical distance or electronic access passcode. Logical control 
utilizes both hardware and software in order to deter access via username and password, 
certificate-based authentication and/or firewalls. Administrative controls are policies, 
procedures, and regulations that are in place to enforce the physical and logical access 
controls. Physical protection is similar to the logical layered protection shown in Figure 
4, necessary to gain access to an asset. However, wireless and remote access usually 
bypasses the physical layer of access control.  
 
Figure 4.  Layered Protection of Logical Asset (from DISA, 2010) 
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1. Identification Credentials 
The process of identifying a user or device level of access is considered 
credentialing. A credential is used to validate a user or device’s identity to gain access. 
Credentials vary depending on the level access a user or device is authorized. To gain 
access to a secured area one must assert an identity and provide a credential as proof of 
that identity (DOD, 2010).  
In order to receive credential the user or device must go through the process of 
identity proofing. This process involves the following steps: 
 Validating the claimed identity of the user or device.  
 Identifier naming and registering 
 Generation of an authentication credential. This can be in the form of a 
PIN, PKI or other identification means. 
 Binding the identity to an intended authentication method. 
The credential must be validated through the authentication process as part of the 
steps to gaining access. (DOD, 2010) 
2. Authentication 
Authentication the process by which a user or device credential is validated. 
There are three factors to validating credentials:  
1. Something the user knows (e.g., a password) 
2. Something the user has (e.g., CAC) 
3. Something the user is (e.g., fingerprint) (DOD, 2010) 
There are three levels of authentication factors: single-factor (either one of the 
above mention factors), two-factor (any combination of two of the above mention 
factors), and three-factors (a combination of all three factors). Depending on the type of 
technology and technique required, it is possible to use all three to achieve the highest 
level of assurance. Table 4 provides the various combination of assurance depending on 
the value of the asset being protected. 
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Table 4.   Authentication Methods (after DOD, 2010) 
Method Authentication Factor(s) Description  
Decal  Something the user has Decal mounted on a motorized 
vehicle. 
Transponder Something the user has Transponder mounted on a motorized 
vehicle used for operating an 
automated entry point. 
Badge Something he user has Not personalized (e.g., visit badge 
without name/photo. 
Key Something he user has Physical key of any kind 
Memory Card Something the user has Refers to memory cards without the 
PIN, whether personalized or not (e.g., 
magnetic stripe, barcode, optical or 
smart cards used as memory cards). 
Smart Card Something the user has Refers to smart card whether 
personalized or not. Includes 
cryptographic and non-cryptographic 
cards. Includes all communications 
interface types (e.g., contact, 
contactless, and combi-cards). 
   
Password Something the user knows DOD complaint password or PIN. 
Unshared 
Combination 
Something the user knows Electronic safe, cipher lock, or PIN 
pad combination which allows 
individualized PINs or combinations. 
Shared 
Combination 
Something the user knows Safe, cipher lock, or PIN pad 
combination with shared combination. 
   
Colleague 
Recognition 
Something the user is Personal recognition by peers and co-
workers. Considered to be attended 
access. Document policy and train 
users. 
User Recognition Something the user is Attended access control 
implementations wherein peers or 
security guard/personnel perform 
identification and authentication. 
Document policy and train users. 
Fingerprint 
Identification 
Something the user is Fingerprint authentication, using one-
to-many match against templates or 
images stored in a remote database. 
This is not match on card. 
Fingerprint 
Verification 
Something the user is Fingerprint authentication using one-
to-one match against templates or 
images stored on the CAC biometric 
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Method Authentication Factor(s) Description  
reference database. 
Hand Geometry Something the user is Hand Geometry authentication using 
one-to many match against templates 
or images of various characteristics of 
the hand and finger measurements (not 
fingerprints) stored in a remote 
database. 
Iris Scan Something the user is Iris Scan authentication using one-to-
many match against templates or 
images of the eye stored in a remote 
database. 
   
Digital  Something the user has Issued by DOD-approved PKI. Use 
digital signature 
Certificate Something the user knows With PIN to unlock private key 
Cryptographic 
Hardware Token 
Something the user has 
Something the user knows 
FIPS 140-2 or NSA certified 
encryption module used in 
cryptographic hardware token to 
implement One time password device 
and PIN or password solution. 
Photo ID Something the user has 
Something the user is 
Verified digital or optical photo ID. 
Use of approved procedures for 
verifying a non-CAC photo 
identification card (e.g., driver’s 
license) 
PIV CAC Photo Something the user has 
Something the user is  
Procedure for verifying the photo on 
the CAC. 
PIV CAC Something the user has Implies that its presence and validity is 
verified by an automated system such 
as a swipe into a reader. The purpose 
is to validate that this a valid CAC 
card only. 
 Something the user has 
Something that the user 
knows 
CAC with PIN for after-hours entry 
into vacant workspace without after-
hours attendant. 
 Something the user has 
Something the user knows 
Something the user is 
Attended or two-person access control 
using a CAC plus PIN.  
 
3. Authorization 
Authorization is the process of determining if the authenticated user or device has 
the appropriate permits to gain access to an asset (e.g., the need to know). Every DOD-
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approved public key infrastructure provides certificate-based authentication for all 
persons authorized access to log on to the network; however there still exists the need for 
mandatory/discretionary access control (DOD, 2010). In other words, authentication 
alone does not equal authorization to assets or security boundaries.  
4. Vulnerability Category Codes  
Severity category codes (CATs) are a measure of risk used to assess a facility or 
system security posture. Every policy identified has a severity code that is based on the 
realized expected loss due to a vulnerability being exploited.  
Table 5.   Vulnerability Severity Code Definitions (from DOD, 2010) 
Category I Vulnerabilities that allow an attacker immediate access into a 
machine, allow super-user access, or bypass a firewall. 
Category II Vulnerabilities that provide information that have a high potential of 
giving access to an intruder. 
Category III Vulnerabilities that provide information that potentially could lead to 
compromise. 
5. Logical Method 
Logical methods are those techniques and technologies that are authorized for 
support to validate a user’s identity. Although, the logical access control methods entail 
security techniques for network access from network architecture controls to port 
security, for the purpose of this thesis the focus will be on user level access security to the 
network; the factors for authentication.  
a. Password 
Prior to the advent of new technology such as PKI, username and password was 
used for identification and authentication in order to gain access to the network. With use 
of the PKI technology, it has become easier to implement multi-factor authentication 
requirements. This has led to the mandate to reduce the usage of password authentication 
authorization and require PKI authentication. This mandate authorizes the use of 
approved digital certificates for authentication to DOD networks, web servers, and 
signing/encrypting email. These certificates are primarily issued on CACs; however, 
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there also exist DOD approved external PKIs used to authenticate to web servers (DOD, 
2010). These external certificates will not reside on the CAC; therefore, it must be kept in 
mind that the requirement for PKI and the CAC is simply the merger of the identification 
card with PKI for ease and increased assurance. This merger allows the access of 
multiple physical and logical assets without the need for multiple credentials and 
authentication tokens for access.  
The CTO 06-02 states DOD is phasing out the use of passwords as a means to 
authenticate for the increased level of assurance the PKI certificate offers. Due to legacy 
systems and/or targeted audience a documented exception to policy will need to exist to 
utilize Alternate Login Tokens (ALT) and username and password to authenticate. This is 
an exception that must be approved by the service/agency PKI PMO, the DOD PKI 
PMO, and DAA. The policy for password configuration still stands, the requirement for 
length and complexity with the use of both alphanumeric and special characters.  
The following are the CATs for username and password authentication:  
(AC34.168: CAT III) The DAA is responsible for ensuring the use of 
username and password is limited to those systems that are cost 
prohibitive, unwarranted, and technologically not feasible. The exception 
must be documented and approved by the DAA, the service/agency PKI 
PMO as well as the DoD PKI PMO.  
(AC34.170: CAT II) Information Assurance Manager (IAM) is 
responsible for ensuring the DoD policy for creation and change of 
passwords are being followed when accessing restricted areas. The must 
be automated procedures in place and users trained on the requirements.  
(AC34.175: CAT I) Information Assurance Officer (IAO) is responsible 
for the removal of default passwords on install devices (e.g., databases and 
operating systems). 
(AC34.180: CAT II) IAO is responsible for ensuring the use of 
individually assigned accounts for users, system, application, and database 
administrators.  
(AC34.181: CAT II) IAO is responsible for ensuring that all shared or 
group authenticators for application or network access is used in 
conjunction with an individual authenticator. Any group authenticator not 
based on DoD PKI policy will be approved by the DAA. 
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(AC34.185: CAT II) IAO is responsible for ensuring shared/group PINs 
and passwords are IAW DoDI 8500.2 Auditing procedures implemented 
in conjunction with these methods to support nonrepudiation and 
accountability. (DOD, 2010) 
b. Public Key Infrastructure 
Public key infrastructure is a two-factor authentication process it represents 
something the user has and knows. When the PKI is stored on a hardware token the level 
of assurance is increased due to the difficulty to attack. Hardware token represents a 
second instance of something that you have (DOD, 2010).  
The infrastructure binds the public keys and user identity by the certificate 
authority (CA) and the validation authority (VA) ensures that the user’s identity is unique 
within the CA domain. The registration authority ensures that the user is bound with its 
public key in a way that there is non-repudiation. PKI’s digital certificates when used 
offer the following services (DOD, 2010):  
 
 Identification and authentication through digital signature of a challenge 
 Data integrity through digital signature of the information  
 Confidentially through encryption 
 Assists with technical non-repudiation through digital signatures 
The PKI important component is the X.509 formatted public key. It combined 
with the private key produce a unique authentication. The data element includes: name of 
user or device; start and end date of validation; public key; name of issuing CA; and the 
digital signature of the CA.  
The Department of Defense Instruction 8520.2 identifies requirements for PKI 
usage for both software and hardware. The primary token is the hardware token 
integrated on the CAC although there are other tokens authorized for use. Regardless of 
whether the PKI is utilized as a hardware or software token, in order to gain access to the 
private key the user is required to provide a PIN or password. The private key represents 
something you have and the PIN used to protect the private key represents something you 
know therefore providing two-factor authentication.   
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In order to access non-public DOD computer networks, systems, and web-based 
applications the use of a DOD-approved PKI certificate is required. The application must 
be PK-Enabled in order for a user to access it without a CAC via either an external DOD-
approved PKI or a DOD compliant username/password. The PKI in itself does not grant 
access into a system, there is the need to have an active account and authorization.  
The following is a list of access codes (ACs) and their vulnerability category for 
PKI utilization (DOD, 2010):  
(AC34.070: CAT II) The IAM will ensure certificates are used for 
authentication IAW DoDI 8520.2, PKI and Public Key (PK) Enabling. 
(AC34.075: CAT I) The IAM will ensure use of DoD-approved PKI 
digital certificates to authenticate requests for access to government 
information not approved for public release. For unclassified sensitive 
assets, the PKI certificate will be considered necessary but insufficient to 
provide authorized access.  
(AC34.080: CAT II) The IAM will ensure implementation of certificate-
based logon to the NIPRNet using DoD-approved PKI as required by DoD 
policy. DoD-approved PKI will be required for SIPRNet when 
implemented in the future.  
(AC34.085: CAT I) The IAM will ensure a DoD-approved PKI certificate 
is used for logon to DoD Enclaves, networks, servers, desktop, laptops, 
and other network capable client devices. If PKI logon cannot be used, 
then a DoD compliant ID/password combination may be used and a 
migration plan implemented IAW JTF-GNO exception reporting 
requirements.  
(AC34.090: CAT I) The IAM will ensure PKI is required for the exchange 
of FOUO information with vendors and contractors, the DoD will only 
accept PKI certificates obtained from a DoD-approved internal or external 
certificate authority. 
(AC34.095: CAT I)The IAM will ensure DoD contractors who are not 
eligible for a DoD- approved PKI get and use digital certificates issued by 
approved external PKIs when interacting with DoD PK-Enabled 
information systems or accessing DoD restricted information and logical 
assets. 
(AC34.100: CAT III) The IAM will ensure System Administrators are 
trained on administration and implementation of PKI and PKE. At a 
minimum, this training will include: 
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 PKI awareness training  
 How to configure systems for certificate-based logon  
 How to configure systems for digital signature  
 How to configure systems for email encryption  
 How to configure systems for Web server certificates  
(AC34.105: CAT II) The IAM will require certificate-based client 
authentication to restricted access (not public) DoD web servers using 
certificates issued by DoD-approved PKI certificate authorities. 
(AC34.110: CAT II) The IAO will ensure Browsers, including those that 
support software tokens, support the use of DoD-approved PKI, High 
Assurance Remote Access (HARA) solution (as appropriate for the 
classification level), or NSA certified solution for storing the user’s 
certificates. (DOD, 2010) 
c. DOD Common Access Card 
The CAC is the approved hardware token for DOD. There are other hardware 
tokens available for use however they do not offer the same increased level of assurance. 
The CAC is the integrated solution for both identification and access control. It is the 
merging of the user’s personal identification with the PKI certificate and keys. 
Figure 5, according to DOD (2010), is an illustration without being an exact 
representation of the layout of the CAC. This illustration highlights the purpose of its 
components and technologies discussed herein. The CAC currently has many 
demographic data elements stored in its integrated circuit chip (ICC). Most of these 
elements are also printed on the card. A cryptographic co-processor and secure storage 
supports the DOD-approved PKI functionality. The complexity of the microprocessor is 
the primary distinguishing feature between a smart card and a memory card. The CAC’s 
barcodes and magnetic stripe store data that can be used by various DOD applications, 
thus, the CAC can also be used as a memory card. The magnetic stripe has no data 
encoded on it at issuance. Organizations may use standard magnetic stripe technology to 
write data to the magnetic stripe. Most applications using the ICC will use the CAC to 
establish user authentication and trusted communication channels, but application data 
will reside in remote databases. 
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Figure 5.  General Illustration of CAC Layout (from DOD, n.d.) 
The biometric data being stored on the personal identity verification (PIV) version 
of the CAC will increase the level of assurance by representing all three factors of 
authentication. Through the use of the photograph and fingerprinting (something the user 
is), PIN (something the user knows) and CAC (something the user has) making the PIV 
the highest level of assurance that can be achieved. 
d. The Process of the Biometric System  
Biometrics are becoming more and more prevalent as technology is advancing in 
order to address the issue with identity theft, computer fraud, and unauthorized access to 
name a few. Companies are developing many methods for biometric use as technology 
advances and the demand increases.  
The DOD is planning for the use of a central biometric repository, which will 
support biometric technology for both battlefield applications, as well as support services. 
Biometric authentication is often used to enhance security. However there are inherent 
risks associated with its use alone. When biometric data is compromised it is not like a 
compromised password or a lost/stolen CAC; it cannot just be changed or replaced. 
Therefore, DOD requires it to be combined with another form of authentication such as a 
password or PIN IAW DOD-approved PKI policy. 
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Biometrics can serves as either an identification or verification process. The 
identification process is a more complicated process in that it is a one-to-many, taking the 
know profile and comparing it against many to get a possible match. Whereas verification 
is a one-to-one process, where a user simply takes the know profile and compares it 
against a stored profile for a user to validate a match.  
6. Enrollment into the Biometric System 
Enrollment requires some form of verification other than biometric to prove a user 
one is the one who he or she claims to be. The stronger the initial identity verification the 
less likely an imposter will be able to impersonate in order to authenticate. The 
enrollment after the initial verification is a process that is implemented in the following 
stages: capture, extraction, package creation and assurance, and package storage. 
In the Capture stage, biometric technology is used to record a user’s physical 
characteristic or behavior. The hardware performing the reading is called the capture 
device. Capture devices typically are designed to capture one biometric characteristic 
such as a fingerprint, retina pattern, or keyboard dynamic.  
In the Extraction stage, the captured information from the capture device is 
translated into a digital representation of the biometric characteristic. This digital 
representation is known as the biometric template.  
In the Package Creation and Assurance stage, the biometric template is associated 
or bound with the user’s identity information (e.g., name, ID, etc.). The package is then 
encrypted and digitally signed to protect its integrity and confidentiality.  
In the Package Storage stage, the biometric package is encrypted and signed 
package the written to a non-volatile storage medium for future use in the verification 
process. This storage medium may, or may not, be integrated into the biometric system. 
For example, packages might be transferred to a smart card or external database.  (DOD, 
2010) 
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a. Verification of the Biometric System 
According to DOD (2010), the stages of the verification process include 
Identification, Capture, Extraction, Package Retrieval and Validation, and Comparison. 
These stages are detailed below. 
 Identification—requires the user to present some form of ID for verification 
 purpose. 
Capture—the same process identified for enrollment. 
Extraction—the same process as biometric template identified during 
enrollment however it’s called live sample. 
Package Retrieval and Validation—the biometric package is retrieved 
from storage and decrypted. Its digital signature is validated to ensure that 
it was created during the enrollment process and not modified since then. 
Comparison—The live sample and biometric template are provided as 
inputs to a software module known as the comparator, which generates a 
score describing how close a match the two are to one another. Based on 
predetermined thresholds, the two are either declared a match given the  
 
 
resulting score (acceptance) or they are not (rejection). The determination 
is forwarded to whatever access control system the biometric technology 
is supporting. (DOD, 2010) 
b. Separation of Duties in the Biometric System 
Administrators are the only users to interact with the system beyond the biometric 
capture device. Therefore, improper administrative access has the potential to cause 
extreme risk to the system. The administrators for the system will need to authenticate to 
the biometric software before any access to controls can be granted. This is an alternate 
authentication in the event that the system has been compromised or is not functioning 
properly.  
According to DOD (2010), as specified by Biometric Verification Mode 
Protection Profile for Medium Assurance Environments, the duties of the administrative 
function should be separate due to the three identified roles in order to prevent a conflict 
of interest as well as for check and balance. 
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 Enrollment Administrator—is responsible for the verifying the identity of 
new users and walking them through the process of enrollment. 
 Security Administrator—is responsible for establishing and 
updating/modifying the configuration parameter values of the software. 
 Audit Administrator—is responsible for reviewing audit logs for security 
violations and related suspicious behavior.  
The combination of any or all of these roles can pose an extremely adverse 
integrity issue that could potentially allowing the administrator to tamper with the system 
in such a way as to make it easy to breach. Whether the software allows for separation of 
these roles or not the information assurance officer should ensure that there are measures 
in place to mitigate this risk. The following are biometric codes that and their categorical 
vulnerability levels: 
(BIO1010: CAT II) The IAO will ensure individuals are assigned in 
writing to the following administrative roles: Enrollment Administrator 
(enroll or re-enroll users); Security Administrator (modify the security 
configuration), and Audit Administrator (review and manage audit logs). 
(BIO1020: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the following functions are 
restricted to authorized Administrators:  
 Creation or modification of authentication and authorization rules  
 Creation, installation, modification or revocation of cryptographic keys  
 Startup and shutdown of the biometric service  
(BIO1030: CAT II) The IAO will ensure only authorized Enrollment 
Administrators are permitted to create user biometric templates.  
(BIO1040: CAT III) The IAO will ensure only authorized Audit 
Administrators can clear the audit log or modify any of its entries.  
(BIO1050: CAT II) The IAO will ensure all Administrators must 
authenticate to the biometric system to perform administrative functions 
and that this authentication must include a factor outside of the biometric 
verification the system supports for ordinary users. (DOD, 2010) 
Figure 6 is a depiction of the various levels of logical access control that are 
authorized for use within DOD for verification and validation of the identity of a user. 
 35
 
Figure 6.  Notional Example of Leveraging Logical Security Services (from 
DISA, 2010) 
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IV. TESTING AND EVALUATION 
In the past decades, mobile devices have significantly changed business 
capabilities, allowing employees access to information resources wherever they are, 
whenever they need to (NIST, 2014). Technologies have allowed access to otherwise 
protected information wherever and whenever creating both opportunities and challenges. 
Due to this ever-growing demand to use personal mobile devices DOD has had to 
establish security policies, which have been outlined in the previous chapters. This 
chapter will demonstrate and analyze the ways and challenges associated with securely 
access a Department of the Navy (DON) website in order to launch training. Due to 
circumstances outside of our control we were only able to test iOS device. The Android, 
along with a more comprehensive testing of the VDI, will be identified for follow-on 
research. 
A. TESTING SCENARIOS 
The purpose of the demonstrations is a proof of concept that you can actually 
access, enroll, and launch training via a personal mobile device. These examples will 
demonstrate that with the proper technologies and adhering to the proper security 
measures, one can use their personal mobile device to conduct training whenever and 
wherever.  
1. iOS and PKard Smart Card Readers 
Thursby is the company that produces the PKard CAC reader for iOS devices, 
which includes iPhone 4S or later, iPad 2Gen or later, and iPad mini. There are two form 




Figure 7.  Plug-in and Case CAC Readers or the iOS (from thursby.com) 
The items necessary to make the connection to NeL are either of the mentioned 
mobile devices, PKard reader, CAC, and Internet connection. Both the Plug-in and the 
Case as well as the iPhone, iPad, and iPad mini were used for the purposes of the 
demonstration and all yield the same results. The reader once connected to the mobile 
devices prompts the user to download the associated application necessary to use the 
reader1. The following are the steps used via all the iOS devices to gain access, enroll, 
and launch training on the NeL site. Once the application is loaded Figure 8 appears. 
 
                                                 
1 See 
http://www.thursby.com/sites/default/files/images/iPad%20and%20iPad%20Mini%20PKard%20Reader_3.
pdf  and 
http://www.thursby.com/sites/default/files/images/iPad%20iPhone%20iPod%20PKard%20Reader_2.pdf 
for the specifications and features of the card readers 
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Figure 8.  Screen Capture of the Application Used for the PKard Reader 
Next, the user will be asked to select the sites he or she wishes to import for easy 
use of access. This step preloads all the DOD sites that require CAC in order to access. 
This import is shown in Figures 9 and 10 as bookmarks. 
 




Figure 10.  Screen Capture of the U.S. Navy Sites 
After importing the sites to bookmark, the user then can click on a folder that will 
take her or him to the list of available site. Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) was used for 
this purpose in order to get to NeL site. This is illustrated in Figure 11.  
The arrow points to the symbol that indicates that the CAC has been inserted into 
the reader and the reader is retrieving the certificates from the CAC. The certificates are 
the ones that will be shown in Figure 12. Once the reader has retrieved the certificates, 
the symbol will reflect a frame with a card inserted as shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 11.  Screen Capture of NKO Site 
Once on the NKO site, the user clicks the Navy e-Learning link and will be 
redirected to a page to select the appropriate client certificate as shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.  Screen Capture of Client Certificates 
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Next, the user will be prompt to enter his or her PIN this is the six digit numeral 
code associated with the user’s CAC for the two factor authenication process for PKI. 
This is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Screen Capture of Authentication Request 
Once the handshake is made and the authentication process is complete the user is 
then granted access to the site as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Screen Capture of NETC Learning Management System site 
Once  the user has successfully access the NeL site, she or he is able to perform 
the same functions as if she or he were using a desktop or laptop device. Functions such 





Figure 15.  Screen Capture of Course Catalog NETC LMS site 
 
Figure 16.  Screen Capture of Enrollment into a Course NETC LMS site 
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Figure 17.  Screen Capture of Confirmed Enrollment on NETC LMS site 
The process to gain access and enroll is the same regardless of the type of PKard 
reader and iOS device used. It is a very straightforward process. The test was to actually 
launch training. After gaining access and being able to enroll that seemed to be a 
relatively simple task to accomplish; however, upon attempting to launch a training 
session it was unsuccessful. This was due to the language the training is written in. The 
native browser for iOS, Safari, does not support Flash, which is what naval training is 
developed in.   
a. Attempts to Launch Training 
Several attempts were made to do a work around to get the training to launch. 
There was an attempt to use an application browser that supported Flash; however, 
because the Thursby Software System was developed strictly to support the native 
browser there was no way to launch another browser application and then invoke the 
Thursby Software system on top or vice versa.  
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There was an attempt to use a virtual machine (VM) to access NeL in order to use 
a browser that would support Flash. In this experiment, we set up a standalone VM 
environment to see if we could use the flash-supported browser in the VM to launch a 
lesson remotely from an iOS device using the Horizon VM View client2. We were able to 
access the VM and invoke a web browser with username/password authentication from 
an iOS device. However, when accessing the VM remotely with the user's CAC 
credential via the Horizon VM View client and the PKcard reader, we got a blank screen 
instead of the remote desktop. 
2. iOS and baiMobile Smart Card Reader  
Biometric is the company that produces the baiMobile CAC reader for iOS 
devices, which include iPIhone 4S or later, iPad 2Gen or later, and iPad mini. There are 
two form factors for the readers as pictured below in Figures 18 and 19. 
 
Figure 18.  3000 MP Bluetooth Smart Card Reader (from 
biometricassociates.com) 
                                                 
2 See http://www.vmware.com/pdf/horizon-view/horizon-client-ios-document.pdf for details. 
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Figure 19.  301MP LT Smart Card Reader (from biometricassociates.com) 
The required items necessary for the reader to work are the mobile device, 
baiMobile reader, CAC, and Internet connection. The baiMobile 301MP LT was used for 
the purposes of this demonstration3. The initial setup started similar to the PKard with the 
connection and prompt to download the associated applications; however, that is where 
the similarities ended. The baiMobile reader requires the use of the baiMobile Credential 
Service application, which is third party software that requires the user to establish an 
account with the Biometric Associates, and store the user’s certificates on their server. 
There was no attempt made to connect via this means because the intent is to be able to 
connect without having to deal with an entity in the middle. Moreover, we were not able 
to log onto NeL directly using either the Horizon VM View Client or the Receiver VM 
View Client and the baiMobile reader.  
The 3000 MP Bluetooth Reader is another biaMobile device that makes the 
claims that it supports DOD CACs and through the use of the reader and middleware 
access to credentials is made available to support such functions as digital signing and 
decrypting emails, and authenticating to secure websites and network servers. The 
software that supports the reader is currently offline due to updates being made by the 
Biometric Associates. 
                                                 




B. EVALUATION OF TESTING 
The following research questions were addressed: 1) Can a secure connection via 
a mobile device be made to access NeL site? 2) Is enrollment into a training session via a 
mobile device possible? 3) Can a training session be launched and completed via a 
mobile device?  A secure connection can be achieved via a mobile device to the NeL site. 
This was made possible by the PKard reader (one of two CAC readers tested) as 
illustrated in Scenario 1 Figure 14. This is significant because it is the first and most 
important step to establishing training whenever and wherever.  
The establishment of a connection to CAC enabled DOD networks via a personal 
mobile device opens the door to many more possibilities of use on a protected 
unclassified network. This could potentially free up space on networks and reduce the 
cost of maintenance for IT devices. This testing can serve as another view of BYOD and 
its possibilities.  
Enrollment into a training session was possible. Once connection was made the 
functionality of enrollment was the same as it would be if we were using a desktop or 
laptop. We are able to select the type of display we would prefer and the appearance is 
similar.  
The ability to launch and complete a training session was not as successful as 
expected. We are prompt to launch a session; however, upon doing so with iOS devices 
we are directed to a blank screen because of the incompatibility of the native browser and 
the language in which the training is developed. This is due to DOD primarily supporting 
Windows Internet Explorer and Flash.  
Overall, the testing was a success with the establishment of a secure connection, 
enrollment into a training session and the ability to access and other sites that proved that 
given training being developed in a language that is support by all browsers then one 
could successfully launch and complete a training session.  
We were not able to test the Android devices due to end of year contracting 
constrains. Table 6 illustrates the devices and methods used as well as the ability to gain 
access to a CAC enabled website.  
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Table 6.   Test Matrixes for NeL Site 





















Y Y  N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
VM 
Authentication 
 N N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Enrollment  Y N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Training   N N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Y= Yes  N= No N/A= Not Tested  
 
The testing proved to be successful for the purpose of this thesis because access 
was granted, enrollment was established, and training was attempted from an iOS with a 
PKcard smart card reader. The necessary security requirements are in place to establish a 
connection in order to conduct training. Although, some will insist that it is only a partial 
success because training was not accomplished we would argue that is an issue that 
requires not just the DoN but also the DOD to support more than just one browser type if 
the intent is to make information access whenever and wherever. That means developing 
information that is supported by such languages as HyperText Markup Language or 
JavaScript. This is something that can be achieved; the Defense Travel System (DTS) has 
managed to crack the code on this. Defense Travel System was one of the many DOD 
sites that were accessed in our attempts to evaluate the possibility of accessing secured 
DOD sites using mobile devices. Once we authenticated with the DTS site using the 
PKard reader and software, we were able to create a travel request as well as a voucher 
request via Safari browser. We were also able to access Marine Online (MOL) and create 
a leave request using an iOS device with the PKard smart card reader.  
The results of the testing indicates that with any IT solution there are issues to 
overcome either in the form of training or performance. Both were experienced during 
these testing. There is a need for a quick reference or guide to explain the setup of the 
CAC reader with each mobile device it supports. 
There are some definite drawbacks such as cost of the reader, form factor, the use 
of VMware, and updates to the operating system (OS). The reader regardless of the 
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developer or the type of device it supports runs from $100.00 to $350.00. The form factor 
is a potential drawback for those plug-in readers. The VMware must be setup to support 
CAC in order to make the secure connection. Due to continuous updates to the OS and 
the requirement for middleware there exist the potential for incapability between the 






V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrated the ability to establish a secure connection to a DOD 
CAC enabled site via a personal mobile device given the current security policies and 
technologies. Once the two-factor authentication was accepted, we were able to enroll in 
a training course. However, due to browser incompatibility, we were not able to launch 
and complete training via the personal mobile device.  
The ability to establish and maintain a secure connection via a personal mobile 
device will open the door to many other opportunities that can prove to be cost effective 
and beneficial for DOD. There is a need for future research to be done in this area 
because it is just another capability of BYOD that has the potential to extend the DOD 
network.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many areas of future research that stem from this thesis that will assist 
in informing DON of the right approach to take in moving closer to a BYOD strategy. 
We have provided some examples of these areas of research below. 
1. Continued Testing of Approved Mobile Devices and Methods 
Due to time constraints and inability to test all devices and methods there exist the 
need to continue testing the iOS and initiate testing of the Android devices for access and 
compatibility.  
2. Support of Multiple Browsers 
In light of the incompatibility issues with native browsers on various mobile 
devices it would be beneficial to do the necessary research to look into what would be 
needed to training in a language that is supported by all browsers such as HTML.  
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3. Support of CAC Enable Sites via VMware 
The use of a VM adds an additional layer of secure to using mobile devices. The 
VM gives added assurance that once the connection is loss no information will reside on 
the device. This helps to make mobile computing more acceptable. 
4. Support of Soft Certification 
The ability to access a CAC enabled site via a soft certification is a capability that 
is desperately needed as technology continues to improve. The form factors of CAC 
readers are more cumbersome than the mobile device itself. There are definitely better 
and just as secure ways to access credentials for a mobile device instead of a hardware 
only solution. It is potentially more cost effective and efficient as well.  
5. Classification of Information 
This may seem unrelated to this thesis. However it makes all the difference in 
how information is handle. There needs to be an in-depth review of policy on what, how, 
and why information is classified the way it is. This could potential take the strain of 
trying to protect information that is already public knowledge due to the great world of 
the Internet.  
6. Hosting a .Com Site 
This would go hand in hand with classification of information research: Is there a 
need for all information pertaining to the DOD to reside in the .mil domain? What would 
be the potential benefits of establishing such a domain to give access to information that 
does not require protection and pose no threat to national security accessed by the 
adversary? 
C. SUMMARY 
This thesis has been informative to the various technologies that exist today that 
support secure connection of mobile devices to a DOD network. It also demonstrates the 
strides DOD is making to partner with industry in order to keep pace with technology.  
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The Department of Defense is not there yet and understandably so due to the need to 
maintain national security with such initiatives as the Mobile Device Strategy it is well on 
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APPENDIX A. SAMSUNG ANDROID WITH KNOX 1.X V2R1 
OVERVIEW 
The following is an excerpt from the Samsung Android (with Knox 1.x) Security 
Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) Overview V2R1. The table shows sample 
configurations for the deployment of Knox containers (Samsung & Defense Information 





























APPENDIX C. APPLE IOS 6 VPN CONSIDERATIONS 
VPN considerations are taken from Apple iOS 6 STIG Overview developed by 
DISA (2013, p. 13).  
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